Professor Roderick John Flower, Biochemical Pharmacology, William Harvey Research Institute, St Barts and the London School of Medicine Queen Mary University of London Charterhouse Square, London EC1M 6BQ, UK; [email protected] O'Neill, a molecular biologist in Frank Herbert's 1982 novel ‘The White Plague’,1 seeks retributive justice for the death of his wife in a terrorist bomb blast by infecting those he holds responsible with an engineered pathogen that kills only women. The eponymous plague soon spreads uncontrollably with predictable catastrophic global consequences.When (...) the definitive history of armed conflict is written, the chapter on biological weapons will make for a long and disagreeable read. Now, happily, disavowed by most nations under the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, the presumption is that any future deployment would be at the hands of rogue states, criminal gangs or perhaps terrorist organisations, to whom they could appeal because of their apparent ease of preparation and dissemination coupled with their sinister reputation and potential for causing mass casualties.But Herbert's villain is different. He is a trained scientist possessing expert skills and with access to pathogens, reagents and cutting-edge technology. Such a person might appear outwardly to be part of the conventional academic establishment except that their motives impel them to act covertly outside the accepted ethical and legal boundaries of their profession. Such ‘outsiders’ evade detection because they act alone and can, through their privileged position, anticipate and thwart regulation or investigation. But is this frightening scenario more than just a plot for apocalyptic novels? Is it a credible threat?In reality, such occurrences seem to be rare. In a comprehensive analysis of 180 incidents involving the use of biological agents during the last century, for instance, Carus2 noted that none of the confirmed bioterrorist attacks by non-state actors …. (shrink)

Tibor R. Machan argues that Gregory R. Johnson and David Rasmussen (in "Rand on Abortion: A Critique," Journal of Ayn Rand Studies, Spring 2000) are mistaken to claim that Rand should have embraced the pro-life position on the issue of a woman's right to seek an abortion. Rand believed that a fetus is only a potential, not an actual, human being. So Willing a fetus is not homicide, any more than killing a seed would be the killing of a flower. (...) Machan's alternative view of abortion is within the spirit of Rand's position, while escaping Johnson and Rasmussen's criticisms. (shrink)

The amount of criticism heaped upon persuadent has obscured consideration of the meaning of picta; for it is this word which carries the weight of the line. Tracing the sequence of thought in the passage will show where the emphasis lies. There is throughout a comparison, either expressed , or implied , between the artless manifestations of nature and their cultivated, trained, or man-made counterparts; ‘wild flowers are more beautiful to behold than cultivated ones; similarly ivy and arbutus which (...) grow as they will are more attractive than those in gardens; natural rills more charming than artificial fountains, … birds which sing from the heart delight us more than those which have been taught.’. (shrink)

The most important distinctively American contribution to philosophy is the pragmatist tradition. In this short, lucid, and completely convincing exposition, Professor John P. Murphy begins by exploring the roots of this tradition as found in the work of Peirce, James, and Dewey, demonstrating its power and originality. Historians of philosophy will appreciate the insight Murphy brings to these figures, but the special value of this book lies in his discussion of how the pragmatist spirit has flowered in contemporary philosophy in (...) the work of Quine, Rorty, and Davidson.Throughout, Murphy emphasizes the logic and structure of the views held by these six philosophers and what it is they have in common that makes their work especially “pragmatist.” There is no better introduction to this historical tradition and perhaps no better way into the philosophies of the contemporaries whom Murphy discusses.Interest in pragmatist ideas is undergoing a revival at present, and this book shows us why. It will be of interest to both historians of philosophy and students of contemporary philosophy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:That St(r)ain Again:Blood, Water, and Generic Allusion in Horace's Bandusia OdeGottfried MaderAbstractHorace's vivid picture of the blood sacrifice to the spring of Bandusia has left many readers feeling somewhat uneasy, for while animal sacrifices appear elsewhere in the Odes,1 none matches this for its pathos or detail:O fons Bandusiae, splendidior vitro,dulci digne mero non sine floribus, cras donaberis haedo, cui frons turgida cornibusprimis et venerem et proelia destinat.frustra: nam (...) gelidos inficiet tibi rubro sanguine rivos lascivi suboles gregis.(Carm. 3.13.1-8)O spring of Bandusia, brighter than glass, worthy of sweet wine and flowers: tomorrow you will be presented with a kid whose forehead, swelling with first horns, destines him for both love and battles—but in vain, for to honour you the offspring of the wanton herd will dye your icy waters with his crimson blood.Hence the protest or surprise expressed at this allegedly offensive intrusion of blood into an otherwise idyllic scene: "Who wants a drink out of the fountain of Bandusia after that?" (Campbell 1924, 2); "[Horace] visualizes with aesthetic relish the mingling of the cool water and the red blood.... [His] behaviour was strange even by ancient criteria" (Nisbet 1962, 198); "somewhat macabre" (Williams 1969, 89); "the scandal of the sacrificial kid, whose death is dwelt upon... with a cruel brilliance quite out of proportion to any decorative needs" (Wilson 1968, 289).2 Others [End Page 51] have attempted to domesticate the sacrifice, urging that the ancients were less sentimental in these matters and justifying the description as rustic realism.3 But neither view accounts adequately for the densely suggestive detail or the perceptible emphasis on the blood offering—in a word, for the poetic intensity of these lines.The sacrifice begins to make sense when we explore its metaphorical possibilities and integrate it into the ode's thematic and intellectual design.4 Recent criticism has emphasized the metapoetic dimension of 3.13, interpreting Horace's homage to the spring as a tribute to the poetry which secures it a place among the celebrated fountains of Greek and Roman literature: "fies nobilium tu quoque fontium / me dicente cavis inpositam ilicem / saxis, unde loquaces / lymphae desiliunt tuae " (13-16; "you too will take your place among the famous springs when I celebrate the ilex set upon the hollow rocks, from which your clear-voiced waters come cascading down"). Further, since springs and water have a long metaphorical association with poetry (cf. below, note 12), the literal shades off easily into the literary, and the fons reflects the ideals and aspirations of Horace's own lyric art.5 From this perspective, the blood sacrifice too acquires a metaphorical nuance. Here is Steele Commager: "Readers have often been repelled by the details of the kid's sacrifice (6-8). Perhaps the description is not there for its realistic effect alone. Destined for love and battle, the 'offspring of the wanton flock' epitomizes life's comprehensive vitality, and as his warm blood mingles with the lucid water it is easy to sense a suggestion of the transformation of life into art" (Commager 1962, 323-24). Ralph Hexter continues on this trajectory: "The image of the red blood of the goat staining the cold spring water reflects the transmutation of life into poetry.... I believe a close reading of the poem supports a further insight: that Horace means to show us how life is transferred to the water of poetry, and by showing us how it is, he shows us that it is."6 Most recently, Gregson Davis has suggested a further association: "Unmixed wine, flowers, and young animal constitute the sine quibus non of the banqueting apparatus.... Horace's fons is to be honored with the irreducible tokens of convivial [End Page 52] poetry. This ensemble of tokens, and not the presumed reference to an obscure festival, is what principally determines the speaker's choice of offerings." And once the choice of offerings has established the lyric orientation, the goat's death suggests to Davis also the mortality topos or the "dark background," typically a foil to the convivial motifs in the context of... (shrink)

The sequence of nucleotide bases occurring in an organism’s DNA is often regarded as a codescript for its construction. However, information in a DNA sequence can only be regarded as a codescript relative to an operational biochemical machine, which the information constrains in such a way as to direct the process of construction. In reality, any biochemical machine for which a DNA codescript is efficacious is itself produced through the mechanical interpretation of an identical or very similar codescript. In these (...) terms the origin of life can be described as a bootstrap process involving the simultaneous accumulation of genetic information and the generation of a machine that interprets it as instructions for its own construction. This problem is discussed within the theoretical frameworks of thermodynamics, informatics and self-reproducing automata, paying special attention to the physico-chemical origin of genetic coding and the conditions, both thermodynamic and informatic, that a system must fulfil in order for it to sustain semiosis. The origin of life is equated with biosemiosis. (shrink)

PROMISE AND PERIL includes essays that explore the idea of republicanism across the history of political thought, focusing on the challenges and dilemmas endemic to popular government.

Recent scholarship has argued that Simon Peter is not the author of 1 Peter, whilst maintaining that the addressees in 1:1 are the real recipients of the letter. We contend that both the stated author and the stated audience are part of the author’s deception. We propose instead that the author may have simply argued that this text was an older letter from Peter. This proposal is consistent with the widely‐held view that pseudepigraphical letters were not knowingly accepted in early (...) Christian circles, as well as the ancient tradition that Peter was believed to be the real author of the text and offers a simple solution as to how the letter escaped the scrutiny that came with pseudepigraphical works. If this thesis is followed, scholarship concerned with uncovering the socio‐economic status of the Christians in Asia Minor based on this text is therefore misguided. (shrink)

THE MOST SACRED FREEDOM includes eight essays that were first presented at the 2014 A.V. Elliott Conference on Great Books and Ideas, the seventh annual conference sponsored by Mercer Universitys Thomas C. and Ramona E. McDonald Center for Americas Founding Principles. Together, these essays explore the great principle of religious liberty by charting its development in the Western tradition and reconsidering its place at Americas founding. The book begins with a comparison between the flood accounts in Genesis and the Mesopotamian (...) Atra-Has's and advances all the way to the 2014 Supreme Court case Burwell v. Hobby Lobby. The intervening chapters examine the contributions of figures such as Emperor Julian, Roger Williams, Cecilius Calvert, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and the American Founders. Contributors to the volume are Steven Grosby, Jeremiah H. Russell, Maura Jane Farrelly, Daniel Cullen, John Witte, Jr., Scott Yenor, David Ramsey, and Michael Novak. (shrink)

The dominant public philosophy of the United States of America has long been some version of liberalism--dedicated to individual liberty, equal rights, religious freedom, government by consent, and established limits on political power. Today, however, we find ourselves in unusual times, when the major political parties have powerful and growing wings that embrace decidedly illiberal public philosophies. On the Left, critical theory eschews Enlightenment rationalism and liberal ideas of toleration and individual liberty as structures that serve to support inequality and (...) oppression. On the Right, conservative scholars excoriate liberalism for privileging an ideal of individual autonomy that eats away at the civilizing bonds of family, tradition, religion, and country. What seems new here is not the critiques themselves, but the power and popularity of political movements that openly and proudly reject the first principles of America's long-dominant public philosophy. Can the center hold? Can the principles of 1776 survive? Or has liberalism run its course? With these questions in the air, this book proposes to return with fresh eyes to the beginning of liberalism and the political philosophy of John Locke. Instead of looking at Lockean liberalism as a simple and timeworn ideological program, the essays reexamine Locke's project by remaining alive to the complexity and nuance with which he addressed his subject. The Locke that emerges is indeed an ambitious and radical thinker, but one not as imprudent or unmindful of custom as his conservative critics would have it, nor as tolerant of oppression as his progressive critics aver. (shrink)

I must begin by confessing that I owe to the deficiencies of voice-mail a valuable occasion to re-think the purpose of this lecture. For I left on the voice-mail of Professor Martin the title of the lecture: “Augustine and a Crisis of Wealth in Late Antiquity.” I received—again by voice-mail—a delighted reply. He fully approved of my title: “Augustine and a Crisis of Wills in Late Antiquity.” I realized, to my shame, that I had awoken false expectations in the (...) heart of a great Augustinian scholar. Of course, “Wills” is what a St Augustine Lecture should be about. It was on the Will that Augustine wrote with greatest passion and tenacity, and with the gravest long-term consequences. And I had offered, for the occasion of a St. Augustine Lecture, not “Will” but merely “Wealth.”. (shrink)

"Biophilia" is the term coined by Edward O. Wilson to describe what he believes is humanity's innate affinity for the natural world. In his landmark book Biophilia, he examined how our tendency to focus on life and lifelike processes might be a biologically based need, integral to our development as individuals and as a species. That idea has caught the imagination of diverse thinkers. The Biophilia Hypothesis brings together the views of some of the most creative scientists of our time, (...) each attempting to amplify and refine the concept of biophilia. The variety of perspectives -- psychological, biological, cultural, symbolic, and aesthetic -- frame the theoretical issues by presenting empirical evidence that supports or refutes the hypothesis. Numerous examples illustrate the idea that biophilia and its converse, biophobia, have a genetic component: fear, and even full-blown phobias of snakes and spiders are quick to develop with very little negative reinforcement, while more threatening modern artifacts -- knives, guns, automobiles -- rarely elicit such a response people find trees that are climbable and have a broad, umbrella-like canopy more attractive than trees without these characteristics people would rather look at water, green vegetation, or flowers than built structures of glass and concrete The biophilia hypothesis, if substantiated, provides a powerful argument for the conservation of biological diversity. More important, it implies serious consequences for our well-being as society becomes further estranged from the natural world. Relentless environmental destruction could have a significant impact on our quality of life, not just materially but psychologically and even spiritually. (shrink)

Advance directives are propagated as instruments to maintain patients’ autonomy in case they can no longer decide for themselves. It has been never been examined whether patients’ and healthy persons themselves are inclined to adhere to these documents. Patients’ and healthy persons’ views on whether instructions laid down in advance directives should be followed because that is (or is not) “the right thing to do”, not because one is legally obliged to do so, were studied and compared with that of (...) medical staff. Method: Vignette study presenting five cases. Cancer patients, healthy persons, nursing staff and physicians (n = 100 in each group) were interviewed. An adherence score was calculated (maximum value 5). The adherence score is found to be low in all groups, yet lowest in patients (1.55; standard deviation 1.13) and healthy controls (1.60; 1.37). The scores are significantly different between nursing staff on the one hand and patients and healthy controls on the other (p < 0.005 and p < 0.05, respectively), and between doctors and patients (p < 0.05). Interviewees who want these documents to be followed tend to live alone and to have already written an advance directive. Conclusions: Cancer patients and healthy persons widely disregard instructions laid down in advance directives and consider them less binding than physicians and nursing staff do. Only a minority tends to adhere more to advance directives. To improve decision-making at the end of life when patients are no longer able to decide for themselves alternative concepts, such as advanced care planning, should be considered. (shrink)

Kierkegaard holds that purity of heart is to will one thing. But his treatment of despair, double-mindedness, and self-deception runs into difficulties over whether one can choose beliefs about oneself, which theories of the will (if any) could establish its unity, and whether the individual who fails to become pure of heart is blameworthy. Pace Kierkegaard, willing the good does not make immutable the person who so wills, and purity of heart should not be entirely will-based. This essay articulates (...) a broad understanding of purity of heart whose value and importance in moral and religious life are much clearer. This understanding recasts willing in terms of certain higher-order desires, identifies ambivalence as a different phenomenon from double-mindedness, brings in motives and beliefs, emphasizes trusting radically in God, and explicates purity of heart as a moral and religious ideal. (shrink)

R. Renehan's ingenious solutions to the problems of Symphosius 42. 1 and Anth. Lat. 207 in this journal , 471 f.) are much to be welcomed. On the other hand, I do not think that his defence of the manuscript reading in Anth. Lat. 24. 3 marcent post rorem violae, rosa perdit odorem holds water. Taking rorem as = rorem marinum he explains that ‘the poet is not presenting us with a piece of botanical information about the relative seasons of (...) the violet and rosemary; he means rather that all flowers wither and fade’. Actually, however, the poet on this showing does present information; and whether the information is botanically correct or not , that is an odd way to make his point. Stranger still is his choice of rosemary out of all the fading flowers of field and garden. It was bound to be I misunderstood. As Renehan indicates, ros = ros marinus is supported only by Virg. Georg. 2. 212–13, where the identity has been doubted, and Plin. HN 24. 100, where ex rore supra dicto refers back to ros marinum in 99. Renehan may well be the first reader not to take rorem as dew. And an evergeen shrub makes a singularly unfortunate illustration of floral decay, even though the shrub does produce a flower. Pliny classes it with herbs. (shrink)

R. Renehan's ingenious solutions to the problems of Symphosius 42. 1 and Anth. Lat. 207 in this journal, 471 f.) are much to be welcomed. On the other hand, I do not think that his defence of the manuscript reading in Anth. Lat. 24. 3 marcent post rorem violae, rosa perdit odorem holds water. Taking rorem as = rorem marinum he explains that ‘the poet is not presenting us with a piece of botanical information about the relative seasons of the (...) violet and rosemary; he means rather that all flowers wither and fade’. Actually, however, the poet on this showing does present information; and whether the information is botanically correct or not, that is an odd way to make his point. Stranger still is his choice of rosemary out of all the fading flowers of field and garden. It was bound to be I misunderstood. As Renehan indicates, ros = ros marinus is supported only by Virg. Georg. 2. 212–13, where the identity has been doubted, and Plin. HN 24. 100, where ex rore supra dicto refers back to ros marinum in 99. Renehan may well be the first reader not to take rorem as dew. And an evergeen shrub makes a singularly unfortunate illustration of floral decay, even though the shrub does produce a flower. Pliny classes it with herbs. (shrink)

Abstract:This essay applies lessons from John Dewey’s theory of democracy and democratic education to the modern development of information communications technologies and the assertion that the development of such technologies will lead to a more open, more democratic society. Given the continuity of the technology and its applications with structures of oppression within modern society, any attempt to resolve or democratize technology through skills-based training is bound to fail, as this does not resolve the cultural habits that enable oppression through (...) technology. To this end, what is necessary is democratic education that recognizes the unique contexts in which students become individuals and furnishes flexible habits of transaction. (shrink)

"How, if at all, is responsibility possible," and "What kind of beings must we be if we are ever to be responsible for the results of our wills?". This study is not intended to guarantee final answers to these questions. What Wolf's study attempts to offer is insight into and a new perspective on the problem of the relationship between responsibility and freedom; it accomplishes this. After introducing us to the dilemma of autonomy as an issue germane to the (...) problem, Wolf embarks upon an examination and criticism of two standard positions: The Real Self View and the Autonomy View. While both of these contain plausible arguments, Wolf's examination exposes their inadequacies. According to the Real Self View, the actions of an agent are free and responsible if those actions arise out of one's own valuation system and are governed by the desires of the real self. The major difficulty is that if the real self is "deeply responsible" so as to deserve praise or blame, it leaves unanswered an explanation of why the real self is "deeply responsible" at all. Hence, the Real Self View fails to provide a solution. The Autonomy View is more radical and less defensible than the Real Self View. An autonomous agent can make choices on no basis, and is no more bound by reason than desire. To want autonomy is not only to want the ability to make choices when no choices exist, but to desire to be able to make choices for no reason, even if a reason exists. Wolf targets the vulnerability of the position. Prescinding from a cognitive perspective of reason, Wolf describes reason as a "normative faculty," or "whatever faculties are thought to be most likely to lead to true beliefs and good values". Concrete examples provide Wolf with supportive evidence that no responsible agent would want the ability to act contrary to reason. Like the Real Self View, the Autonomy View is inadequate. Wolf procedes to formulate her own theory in which reason plays a pivotal role. Her view is marked by a refreshing simplicity that does not undermine its philosophical soundness or its persuasiveness. According to Wolf's view, or the Reason View, the condition for responsibility is the ability to act in accordance with right reasons, the true, and the good. Philosophically, the true and the good are concepts that invite endless inquiry and debate. Wolf wisely avoids the pitfalls of many inquisitors and assumes a common sense, matter of fact approach to what constitutes the true and the good. There is objectivity in the world sufficient to yield empirical beliefs. Responsible agents are able to discern the true from the false and form value judgments that serve as a basis for action. Absolute metaphysical independence is not integral to responsible action, since there is always the presence of physical and psychological factors. But these factors are not so great as to deter or hinder responsible action. Whether or not an agent ultimately chooses to do that which is objectively better than something else does not alter the fact that one has the ability to act responsibly. Using the fundamental rational powers of perception, imagination, reflection, training, and logical thinking, the agent can recognize and appreciate the true and the good and act in accordance with them. The Reason View presumes that those whose intellectual and emotional capabilities fall within the range of normality are able to perceive what is objectively valid and morally good. Responsible action extends beyond the bounds of the moral sphere. Included under the category of responsible action are aesthetic, as well as personal, goals, and whatever else may be seen as good for the agent. What reason values as good has objective validity, albeit not absolute validity. What is good for the agent can never be judged apart from a given, determinate environment or from the psychological disposition of the agent that has its own normative competence. In its judgments, reason accommodates itself to both factors, and the responsible agent comes to see and appreciate the True and the Good. Wolf does not absolutize her theory; she offers it as working moral certitude for responsible agents. Her claim is that if the Reason View is correct, "It is important to cultivate and promote an open and active mind and an attitude of alertness and sensitivity to the world," so that one can come to "appreciate the True and Good" and "direct one's actions, in light of them". One can find little to discredit in Wolf's arguments, and her approach to the problem of the relationship between responsibility and freedom provides a relief from the tedious and convoluted debates that often take place when this issue is the topic.--Kathleen R. Madden, Chicago, Ill. (shrink)

A major new interpretation of the Declaration of Independence and of the philosophical background of Thomas Jefferson at the time of its composition. Garry Wills attempts to reconstruct the intellectual atmosphere in the 18th century, and by attending to Jefferson’s draft of the Declaration in comparison with the revised draft adopted by Congress, he seeks to show that Jefferson was deeply influenced in his thought and phrasing not by John Locke, as the standing interpretation of Carl Becker holds, but (...) by the Scottish philosopher of moral sense, Francis Hutcheson. Wills’s book, then, is not only a byproduct of the recent Bicentennial, but also a contribution to the growing literature on the Scottish Enlightenment and on the role of Scottish philosophy in American intellectual history. (shrink)

Recent efforts in soft robotics and Artificial Life are attempting to construct homeostatically functioning machines with ‘feeling’ analogues. Such robots are designed to be ‘vulnerable’ and, thus, depart from traditional approaches to machine design and construction. In this paper, I explore a representative proposal by Antonio Damasio and Kingson Man, and ask how we can understand the deconstruction of ‘life’ in Derrida, Stiegler, Malabou and Wills to relate to such efforts. I argue that the adoption of biological and phenomenological (...) principles in machine design calls for attention to the precise extent that it may not result in robots that adhere either to biological or to mechanical models. It is with this admission, of the essentially unknowable character of what may result from these efforts, that deconstruction can assist roboticists and synthetic biologists today. (shrink)

Using covariant derivatives and the operator definitions of quantum mechanics, gauge invariant Proca and Lehnert equations are derived and the Lorenz condition is eliminated in U(1) invariant electrodynamics. It is shown that the structure of the gauge invariant Lehnert equation is the same in an O(3) invariant theory of electrodynamics.

This essay briefly describes a few of the problems associated with using personhood language to defend the right to life of the pre‐implantation embryo. Arguing that an immaterial soul explains the personal identity of an embryo is problematic for many people because there is no apparent spiritual activity in the unborn. While some scholars argue that the embryo has the potential to act as an adult person and thus should be protected from harm, others contend that potentiality alone is insufficient (...) reason to ascribe special moral worth to the embryo in utero. For Thomas Aquinas, the soul is not only the life‐principle that organizes the human body, but it is also that by which the human being thinks and wills. By making suitable corrections to Aristotle's hylomorphic depiction of the soul–body relation, I suggest that a rational soul must be present from the moment of conception and that it is at the service of the person. What is of critical importance here is to accept that a human being is present from the moment of conception, something the vast majority of embryologists maintain, notwithstanding the inveiglement of those who state that the pre‐implantation blastocyst is simply a disorganized clump of cells. (shrink)

If there is room for a substantial conception of the will in contemporary theorizing about human agency, it is most likely to be found in the vicinity of the phenomenon of normativity. Rational agency is distinctively responsive to the agent's acknowledgment of reasons, in the basic sense of considerations that speak for and against the alternatives for action that are available. Furthermore, it is natural to suppose that this kind of responsiveness to reasons is possible only for creatures who possess (...) certain unusual volitional powers, beyond the bare susceptibility to beliefs and desires necessary for the kind of rudimentary agency of which the higher animals are arguably capable. (shrink)

Consumer autonomy is a fundamental topic for marketing ethics scholars. Nonetheless, autonomy’s philosophical treatment may have compromised its conceptual clarity. After reviewing the relevant ethics literature on consumer autonomy, the benefits of formally defining consumer autonomy are illustrated, and a novel formalization is adapted from potential performance theory mathematics. The goal is to transfigure a hitherto amorphous topic via a mathematical formalization that defines true autonomy, actual autonomy, reliability of wills, and reliability of product choice. The crucial and surprising (...) result: an action that decreases true autonomy can increase actual autonomy if that action engenders a sufficient increase in one or both types of reliability. Relating the insights from the formalization to the long-standing debates in consumer autonomy suggests fruitful avenues for future research. (shrink)

The paternalism, autonomy debate was influenced by traditional ideas that reasons are either objective (based on values existing independent of any particular person) or subjective (based on values tied to individual's personal histories). This dichotomy has been rewarding for the health care community. However, the tenets of this debate have influenced the nature of deliberation in a way that seriously compromises the ability of health care professionals and patients to bring reflection (the search for justified reasons) to a successful end. (...) It sets up the moral landscape not as one of unity and reciprocity, but as one of divisiveness and distance-where one person (the physician) does something to another (paternalism) or for another (patient autonomy), rather than with another. This distance and divisiveness undermines the unity of wills and genuine reciprocity that I argue is indispensable for genuinely good relationships and necessary for successfully establishing what reasons there are to act. It has created an abyss in communication that even recent suggestions for change cannot bridge. In this paper, I discuss the nature of this abyss and the problems it has created by demonstrating that traditional theoretical ideas about the nature of reasons have influenced the nature of deliberation in health care. I argue that recent suggestions for “justified paternalism” fail to bridge the abyss. Finally, I suggest that to be successful, we must change the framework; we must reject the ideas of objective and subjective value and embrace instead the idea that values are intersubjective. (shrink)

This essay examines the traumas inflicted by acts of false-flag state terrorism on 11 September 2001, and their concealment by exploitation of mythicist falsifications that are endemic to our culture—while also paying particular attention to parallels between the staging of explosive demolitions for the WTC Towers and gutting of the Reichstag by Nazi incendiaries in 1933. The study culminates in a depiction—based on heuristic distinctions between natural, gnomic, alethic, and personal wills—of how we become vulnerable to mythicist falsifications, and (...) how truth-telling facilitates recovery of our moral integrity after the twin traumas of betrayal by acts of state terror, and complicity with that betrayal, have deeply compromised it. (shrink)

Behavioral evidence for the COVIS dual‐process model of category learning has been widely reported in over a hundred publications (Ashby & Valentin, ). It is generally accepted that the validity of such evidence depends on the accurate identification of individual participants' categorization strategies, a task that usually falls to Decision Bound analysis (Maddox & Ashby, ). Here, we examine the accuracy of this analysis in a series of model‐recovery simulations. In Simulation 1, over a third of simulated participants using an (...) Explicit (conjunctive) strategy were misidentified as using a Procedural strategy. In Simulation 2, nearly all simulated participants using a Procedural strategy were misidentified as using an Explicit strategy. In Simulation 3, we re‐examined a recently reported COVIS‐supporting dissociation (Smith et al., ) and found that these misidentification errors permit an alternative, single‐process, explanation of the results. Implications for due process in the future evaluation of dual‐process theories, including recommendations for future practice, are discussed. (shrink)

Hume regards the will as an impression which normally is followed by an appropriate bodily movement. It is unclear why he adopts this theory instead of saying that passions are directly followed by actions (a view which would in some respects suit him better). I suggest that he needs impressions of the will to explain our knowledge of our own acts. They thus play an indispensible role in hume's newtonian science of the mind.

I do not propose to attempt in this article to make any exact or exhaustive definition of religion, but rather to call attention to one of its outstanding psychological characteristics. At the outset, then, I take it for granted that religion is primarily a feeling experience. We make use of the term ‘religion,’ it is true, for many things in addition to immediate feeling experiences, and it is inevitable that we should do so. But it will be well to bear (...) in mind that when we describe Buddhism or Christianity as ‘a religion’ we are using the term in a secondary fashion. A man may accept the tenets, and to some extent practise the commandments, of a religion in this sense without being religious. (shrink)

The thesis of this article is that there has never been any ground for the controversy between the doctrine of free will and determinism, that it is based upon a misapprehension, that the two assertions are entirely consistent, that one of them strictly implies the other, that they have been opposed only because of our natural want of the analytical imagination. In so saying I do not tamper with the meaning of either phrase. That would be unpardonable. I mean free (...) will in the natural and usual sense, in the fullest, the most absolute sense in which for the purposes of the personal and moral life the term is ever employed. I mean it as implying responsibility, merit and demerit, guilt and desert. I mean it as implying, after an act has been performed, that one " could have done otherwise " than one did. I mean it as conveying these things also, not in any subtly modified sense but in exactly the sense in which we conceive them in life and in law and in ethics. These two doctrines have been opposed because we have not realised that free will can be analysed without being destroyed, and that determinism is merely a feature of the analysis of it. And if we are tempted to take refuge in the thought of an "ultimate ", an "innermost" liberty that eludes the analysis, then we have implied a deterministic basis and constitution for this liberty as well. For such a basis and constitution lie in the idea of liberty. -/- The thesis is not, like that of Green or Bradley, that the contending opinions are reconciled if we adopt a certain metaphysic of the ego, as that it is timeless, and identifies itself with a desire by a " timeless act". This is to say that the two are irreconcilable, as they are popularly supposed to be, except by a theory that delivers us from the conflict by taking us out of time. Our view on the contrary is that from the natural and temporal point of view itself there never was any need of a reconciliation but only of a comprehension of the meaning of terms. (The metaphysical nature of the self and its identity through time is a problem for all who confront memory, anticipation, etc.; it has no peculiar difficulties arising from the present problem.) -/- I am not maintaining that determinism is true; only that it is true insofar as we have free will. That we are free in willing is, broadly speaking, a fact of experience. That broad fact is more assured than any philosophical analysis. It is therefore surer than the deterministic analysis of it, entirely adequate as that in the end appears to be. But it is not here affirmed that there are no small exceptions, no slight undetermined swervings, no ingredient of absolute chance. All that is here said is that such absence of determination, if and so far as it exists, is no gain to freedom, but sheer loss of it; no advantage to the moral life, but blank subtraction from it. -- When I speak below of "the indeterminist" I mean the libertarian indeterminist, that is, him who believes in free will and holds that it involves indetermination. (shrink)

The contributors to The Moral of the Story, all preeminent political theorists, are unified by their concern with the instructive power of great literature. This thought-provoking combination of essays explores the polyvalent moral and political impact of classic world literatures on public ethics through the study of some of its major figures-including Shakespeare, Dante, Cervantes, Jane Austen, Henry James, Joseph Conrad, Robert Penn Warren, and Dostoevsky. Positing the uniqueness of literature's ability to promote dialogue on salient moral and intellectual virtues, (...) editor Henry T. Edmonson III has culled together a wide-ranging exploration of such fundamental concerns as the abuse of authority, the nature of good leadership, the significance of "middle class virtues" and the needs of adolescents. This collection reinvigorates the study of classic literature as an endeavor that is not only personally intellectually satisfying, but also an inimitable and unique way to enrich public discourse. (shrink)